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Drafi Recommcnd.ation
on the future of Europeu securitY -
reply to the aanual repoa olthe Council
The Assembly,
O Noting the motion for a resolution in Document I168;(it) Having taken cognisance of the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council;
(iii) |r[sting that member governments decided on the occasion of the accession of Portugal and Spain
io'WEU to prepare a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty and noting the statement by 
-the
Chairrran-in-bffice of the Council on 16th March 1989 that * the Assembly will be regularly consulted
on this matter as the work progresses';
(iv) Noting that the Council has said it is * willing to meet those needs of the Assembly which are the
direct result of enlargement';
(v) Noting that the Council of Ministers has 'instructed the Permanent Council to review the
question of in institute for strategic studies and the related question of the WEU agency";
(vt) Recalling that the Presidential Committee expressed an opinio-n on-these points in Recommen-
ilation 467, t$ngthat the Council establish 'a European institute for advanced securitystrrdies....in
order to promdte-a European spirit in matters of defence' and'that the mandate of the WEU security
agencies be brought to an end ";
(vit) Considering that the colloquy on the future of European s-ecurity_lefd in Florence from 2lst to
23id March 1989-allowed a useful ieview to be made of the new facts of this question which will guide
the work of WEU in the coming years,
I
RrcouvreNps rHAT rnr Courqcll
1. Give an organogram of the intergovernmental organs of WEU;
2. In its annual report, give the Assembly detailed information on every aspect of the application of
the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Continue to keep the Assembly regularly informed about all its activities, in particular through
regular letters from the Secretary-General;
4. Ensure that it gives more detailed and quicker answers to Assembly recommendations;
5. Make available without delay the premises needed to accommodate the Portuguese and Spanish
Delegations in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly;
6. To this end, take early action on Recommendation 467;
7. Promote a more active public information policy on the requirements of European security;
8. Define without delay a draft statute for a European institute for advanced security studies and
submit it to the Assembly for a joint examination of the implications of its implementation;
il
Arso nscolrlMENDs rHAT THE CouNctt-
l. Specifi as soon as possible which provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty it intends to revise;
2. Adopt no provision which might weaken the impact of Article V;
3. Retain in full the preamble and Articles I, II and III of the treaty which make WEU an essential
factor in the establishment of a European union;
4. Maintain the provision in Article IX for the Assembly to be composed of delegations from the
national parliaments of member countries.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur)
Pmr ONs
I. Introduction
1. The present report has to take account ofa
large number of events that have occurred in
WEU in recent months. After the signing of the
act of accession of Portugal and Spain to the
modified Brussels Treaty, including the decision
to revise the treaty, applications from Turkey
and then Greece to join WEU, the arrival at the
Office of the Clerk of the second part of the
thirty-fourth annual report of the Council, the
adoption by the Presidential Committee of a rec-
ommendation on the restructuring of the WEU
ministerial organs, the colloquy on the future of
European security held in Florence from 2lst to
23rd March and then the ministerial meeting in
London on 3rd April 1989, followed by a joint
meeting with two Assembly committees on 4th
April, constitute new factors which compelled
your Rapporteur to make major changes to the
text he submitted on 23rd February for a first
reading by the General Affairs Committee. He
has also had to take account of remarks made by
several committee members at that meeting.
2. Two mandates were also assigned to the
General Affairs Committee. One was to deal
with the problem of 'the integration of Europe
with a view to European union: WEU's r6le t-
the question raised by Mr. Pannella and others in
the motion for a resolution published as Doc-
ument 1168 and referred to the General Affairs
Committee by Presidential Committee decision
of l9th January 1989. The other was to explain
the Assembly's views on proposals to create a
Furopean institute for advanced security studiesin accordance with the wish expressed by SirGeoftey Howe, Chairman-in-Office of the
Council, at the joint meeting on 4th April 1989.
On this last point, your Rapporteur has to note
that compliance with this request would have
been easier if the texts of proposals made to the
Council had been transmitted to the Assembly.
He has to base his thinking on vague, indirect
echoes about a question which the Permanent
Council is required to study on the basis of
written and probably detailed documents.
3. The colloquy on the future of European
security organised by the General Affairs Com-
mittee allowed a wide-ranging discussion to be
held on the basis of five topics, remarkably well
introduced by five particularly competent
rapporteurs. The synthesis was presented with
talent and authority by Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secre-
tary-General of WEU. Since the proceedings of
the colloquy are to be published separately, you
Rapporteur has no need to present them. In the
present report, he will merely draw certain con-
clusions more specifically related to the course
that should now be set for WEU.
II. The problcms
4. Since 1984, the question of reactivating
WEU has been put openly but answered only in
part, allowing various contradictory interpreta-
tions or even proposals, to the point that the
reality of reactivation, proclaimed by official
Council representatives, is being questioned witb
increasing frequency by the media and even by
ministers of member countries and the President
of the French Republic in an address to the
Institut des hautes etudes de d6fense nationale in
Paris in October 1988. The prospect of revising
the texts resulting from the 1954 Paris Agree-
ments makes it necessary to identify first the
reasons ca[ing for and still compelling reacti-
vation and then the obstacles which have so far
limited its impact.before examining what it is
now possible and desirable to achieve.
5. Some of the reasons why the governments
wished to reactivate WEU are permanent,
although they are not all accorded equal impor-
tance, others are more occasional. The following
are worthy of note:
6. (i) The idea already put forward by Mr.
Jobert, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of
France, when addressing the Assembly in 1973,
that the Western European countries need a
forum in which to examine together their
security problems. However, the development of
European political consultations since then
could, by and large, meet that requirement.
Moreover, the NATO authorities, the United
States Government and the governments of
several European countries, whether members of
WEU or not, have long expressed serious reser-
vations about anything that might seem to
indicate a division within NATO or cause such a
division. At the same time, the fact that France's
withdrawal from the integrated military struc-
tures broueht about such a division gave WEU a
special r6le as a link between France and NATO.
It was thus in these various contexts that in 1984
the governments agreed to develop intergovern-
mental consultations in the framework of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
7. The question is whether such consulta-
tions between the WEU member countries are
still desirable. Can they be hetd in the framework
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of the Community in spite of the fact that several
of its members seem hardly prepared to share the
views of the Nine on security matters? This view
was strongly upheld by General Copel of France
in his information letter D6fense active of l5th
January 1989, in which he wrote: * All WEU's
responsibilities must be quite simply transferred
to the European Communities ", which he con-
siders quite feasible * with a little determination
and a lot of good will ". This view also underlies
the motion for a resolution in Document 1168
tabled in the Assembly on 5th December 1988,
calling for a new plan for European union to be
drawn up in 1989 by the European Parliament to
be elected next June in accordance with the
broad lines of the draft treaty already approved
by the European Parliament on 14th February
1984. This motion:
* Wishes this new draft treaty, covering
several areas of political integration,
including security and defence, to be rat-
ified by member states at an early date;
Affirms formally that the completion of
this process, vital for a closer union of
European nations, must mean the
European union (United States of Europe)
progressively assuming the prerogatives
and duties now exercised by WEU. "
However, the treaties establishing the European
Community give it no responsibility for defence
matters and there is every reason to think that
some WEU member governments are not at all
anxious to extend Community prerogatives in
that direction. It is even more probable that
those member countries of the Community that
have not applied for membership of WEU, in
particular lreland, are not prepared to agree to
the Community being extended to include
defence. Austria's application for membership of
the Community, which will probably be sub-
mitted in the next few months, will force it to
make a choice with enduring consequences, since
Austria's neutral status is guaranteed by an inter-
national treaty which forbids it to take part in a
military alliance.
8. A fact that must be noted is that, in
security matters, there are very great differences
of views both among governments and among
the peoples of Western Europe, and institutional
procedures would not suffice to overcome these
differences. For instance, the Spanish people in
no way share the views of representatives of
French public opinion on the r6le of nuclear
weapons in European security. Conversely,
Spain and France hold similar views on the
importance Europe should attach to the inte-
grated military commands, whereas these views
differ widely from those of most of their
partners. The German people, for their part,
divided between two states that would inevitably
be in conflict in the event of world war, have
concepts of security and peace that are not
exactly the same as those of peoples further away
from a possible combat area. Finally, the
Western European countries do not all have the
same means of intervening outside the European
continent. Some want to avoid intervention at
all costs, while others consider they have vital
interests to defend abroad. Thus, although five of
them deployed naval forces in the Gulf in 1987
and 1988, this was merely on a basis of " co-
ordination o', very limited in the case of Italy and
France. Integration of these armed forces would
have made the operation subject to decision-
taking procedures that would in any event have
been too slow to allow them any chance of
success and would very probably have made
them ineffectual. There can be no joint defence
outside Europe without a joint external policy
and even the single European act lays no true
foundation for such a policy.
9. The single act establishes a hierarchy of
bodies designed for political co-operation:
European Council, meetings of ministers for
foreign affairs, Political Committee, European
Correspondents' Group and groups ofexperts on
each topic. Any decisions taken at meetings have
to be taken unanimously: the governments have
never agreed to majority voting procedures, thus
firmly limiting Europe's decision-taking ability
in this area.
10. The only innovation the single act intro-
duced into political co-operation is the creation
of a permanent secretariat to assist the presi-
dency with the preparation and implementation
of consultations, but it has no powers of initi-
ation or implementation. It is the presidency that
is entrusted with very limited powers of initi-
ative and it represents the Twelve as a whole
when a joint decision has to be implemented.
11. It should also be added at once that Article
30, paragraph 6, of the single act further reduces
the scope of European political consultation
where defence questions are concerned. The
member states admittedly indicate in that para-
graph 
. 
that they " consider that closer co-
opelation on questions of European security
would contribute in an essential way to the
development of a European identity in external
policy matters " but the paragraph specifies that
'u they are ready to co-ordinate their positions
more closely on the political and economic
aspects of security -. The military aspects are
therefore excluded, the single act not including
them among the responsibilities, even potential,
of the Twelve.
12. On lTth January, the Minister for Foreign
Alfairs of Spain, Chairman-in-Office of the EEC,
summed up the situation most realistically by
sayrng that the time had come for the Twelve to
cohsider going further than mere co-ordination
in security matters. He said that the new impetus
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being given to the dialogue with the Soviet
Union and other member states of the Warsaw
Pact meant that * we should be fully aware of the
primordial importance of developing the security
dimension in the context of the process of
building a European union ". When the time
comes to consider the possibility of revising Title
III of the single act, he adde{ it will be necessary
to examine whether the limils imposed in Article
30 on the Twelve's co-ordination of security
matters should be exceeded- 'Spainos accession
to WEU is the consequence of a separation
whose existence is recognised in the single act
and which my country wishes to be brought to an
end- In the meantime, we are bound not to shirk
an essential debate. " The purpose ofthe present
report is to introduce this essential debate.
13. (ii) The necessity for Europe, if it wishes to
keep its armaments industries, to co-operate far
more closely than in the past" In 1955, this
necessity was plain to the seven WEU countries
which set up the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee and it has since become more urgent
Conversely, although Article 223 of the Rome
Treaty does not preclude all Communiff activity
in security matters, in paragraph I it is provided
that:
" (a) to member state shall be obliged to
supply information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to the
essential interests of its security;
(b) ny member state may take such
measures as it considers necessary
for the protection of the essential
interests of its security which are
connected with the production of or
trade in arms, munitions and war
material; such measures shall not,
however, adversely affect the condi-
tions of competition in the common
market regarding products which are
not intended for specifically military
puq)oses. "
14. Furthermore, in Article 30, paragraph 6, of
the single European act, the signatory states
declare their determination '1s laaintain 1fos
technological and industrial conditions necessary
for their security. They shall work to that end
both at national level an4 where appropriate,
within the framework of the competent institu-
tions and bodies ", which is quite clearly non-
committal. Moreover, the same paragraph ends
with a remark that " nothing in this tifle shall
impede closer co-operation in the field of
security between certain of the high sontra6liag
parties within the framework of the Western
European Union or the Atlantic Alliance'.
15. Conversely, intergovemmental institu-
tions other than WEU have tried to develop
international co-operation in armaments
matters, either in the framework of NATO or
among its European member countries. Fur-
thermore, the creation of a single European
market as from January 1993 will compel the
Community to consider the problem of the
armaments industries from a new angle as they
become increasingly dovetailed in industrial
activity with the use of a wide variety of tech-
nology in the production of armaments. The
Commission of the Community is also consid-
ering introducing customs duties for imports of
defence equipment by member countries, thus
increasing Community resources. This is
meeting with strong opposition from the United
States, the main supplier of arms to member
countries, as it would thus be excluded from
these markets in favour of its European compet-
itors. This is an area in which European and
Atlantic interests diverge sharply.
16. At the time of the Rome declaration, the
WEU member countries gave priority to the
choice of the IEPG for organising European
co-operation in this area, reserving for WEU a
r6le of 'political impetus' which the WEU
Council has never explained. The Standing
Armaments Committee no longer meets, except
at the level of a few sub-groups, while the IEPG
decided at its meeting in Seville in 1988 to set up
certain structures.
17. In order to see more clearly in this area,
several levels have to be circumscribed:
(a) from an industrial standpoint, consid-
eration should be given to the restruc-
turing which might be carried out in
the framework of the Community on
the one hand and the way techno-
logical arms development programmes
are accepted on the other in order to
see what the next step should be.
Nothing seems possible before 1992;
(b) for military orders, there is every
interest in holding exchanges of views
in the widest, most flexible framework
possible, and the IEPG is probably the
best one;
(c) findly, faced with a still very vague
future, the WEU Council should not
give up its right of initiative in fos-
tering, encouraging and facilitating
co-operation, even if it is to be
developed in other forums, just as the
Assembly must not, in such matters,
give up hope of finding a competent
partner in the Council. It has always
wished the latter to report to it on the
work of the IEPG in one way or
another. In this connection, at thejoint meeting on 4th April 1989 it
received, if not an official answer, at
least words of encouragement from
the Chairmanship-in-Office of the
CounciI.
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18. (iii) The proposals that led directly to the
reactivation of WEU date back to the time when,
following NATO's twofold decision in 1979,the
Wes! noting that tpe Soviet Union was con-
fiarring to deploy medium-range SS-20 missiles,
decid€d in turn to deploy Pershing II and cruise
missiles on the territory of several NATO and
WEU member countries. In 1983 in particular,
with the encouragement of the Soviet Union,
this deployment aroused a strong anti-nuclear
movement in many westem countries and one
might have wondered whether western cohesion
would survive the crisis.
19. This prompted the governments to con-
sider whether it would be possible to pursue a
coherent security policy if they could not manage
to convince public opinion of the need for it. The
reactivation of WEU, as envisaged in 19M, con-
cerned the Assembly first and foremost, as it is
oonsidered to be the ideal instrument for action
to promote joint defence among a public which
did not seem to be very convinced. The
Assembly, for its part, recalled that as a parlia-
mentary body it would not just echo the views of
the governments, but being in touch with public
opinion it oould make the public grasp the true
dimensions of the problem through encounters
with the Council, debates and dialogue, not by
mere public relations methods. As your
Rapporteur has already said several times, in the
end it was the failure of European political con-
sultations on security matters that gave decisive
impetus to the reactivation of WEU.
20. Furthermore, WEU parliamentarians can
play such a r6le because the Assembly is com-
posed of members of national parliaments,
capable of acting in their own countries to bring
out the European dimension of security matters,
in particular when they take part in debates and
voies on defence budgets. This consideration is
the basis for the Assembly's constant call for an
improvement in the dialogue with the Council, a
European dialogue dssigned to promote a
European view of security problems in national
parliaments.
21. (iv) There is no doubt that certain aspects
of United States security policy made many
Europeans want more exchanges of views on the
questions thus raised.
(a) President Reagan's March 1983 announ-
cement of his strategic defence initiative, design-
ed to protect American territory against Soviet
missiles through mastery of space, led Europeans
to consult each other in WEU, on the one hand
on their possible participation in the project and
on the other on its probable consequences for
Europe's security.
(b) The fact that the Reykjavik summit
meeting in October 1986 almost led to a nuclear
disarmament agreement, about which the United
States' allies had not been consulted, led the
latter to try to organise themselves to give greater
weight to opinions on which they could agree.
(c) The discussion that has been under way in
the United States for several years about a reori-
entation of the country's defence policy towards
Iatin America, the Middle East and the Pacific
at the expense ofthe continuing presence ofthe
Amerien forces now in Europe has encouraged
Europeans to make an effort to co-ordinate so as
to compensate, as far as possible, for the weak-
sning of the alliance if American forces were toh redeployed outside EuroPe.
(d) Long reluctant about the public expression
of European views on security matters, the-
United States authorities changed their point of
view sharply in 1987-88:
(y' beeuse they saw that WEU, far from
being an obstacle to their policy, could
on the contrary support them, as in
December 1987 when the WEU
Assembly, by unanimously approving
the INF agreement, helped the United
States Government to convince Con-
gress that the agreement would not
estrange EuroPe from the United
States. Similarly, WEU's action in the
Gulf helped the United States admin-
istration to show that America had not
taken isolated action in that region;
(ii) becaase they hoped WEU would be a
- 
useful partngr 
- 
lq promoting their
views, particularly on imProved
burden-sharing in the alliance in
return for more responsibility-
sharing.
22. (v) C-ertain threats to international peace
in areas not covered by the North Atlantic
Treaty led the WEU member countries to
develop their consultations. These went as far as
a co-oidinated mine-sweeping operation in the
Gulf as from July 1988. What the Chairmanship-
in-Office of the Council said on 4th April 1989
gives the impression that the Council is seriously
considering grving these consultations the per-
manent nature they always lacked.
23. (vi) The development of d6tente and the
extension of negotiations on conventional,
nuclear and chemical disarmament are forcing
Europeans to view their security from a new
standpoint. As long as there is a major threat to
Europe, and in particular its centre, the Atlantic
Alliance, designed to meet this threat, will
remain the keystone of European security.
24. If these really are the reasons that led to
the reactivation of WEU, it is possible to draw a
few conclusions on how a forthcoming revision
of the modified Brussels Treaty should be
envisaged.
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(a) A revision must in no event call in
question the system of security and deterrence
offered by the Atlantic Alliance: the platform
adopted in The Hague showed that the seven
governments 
- 
or even nine, since Portugal and
Spain have subscribed to that document 
- 
were
convinced of this necessity.
(b) It must maintain or even develop a close
association between WEU and the European
Community, bearing in mind the possibility of a
merger of the European organisations.
(c) It must allow dOtente to be continued and
generalised, ensuring that twelve-power Europe
does not stand in the way of the development of
relations of all kinds between the two halves of
Europe. In this connection, a merger of the two
institutions would probably make the Soviet
Union exert very strong pressure against any
enlargement of the Community and slow thegowth of trade between the Eastern European
and Community countries.
25. The revision of the treaty should be
examined in the light of these requirements.
III. The enlargement ol WEU
26. Following the accession of Portugal and
Spain, the question of the further enlargement of
WEU has again arisen officially with the candi-
datures of Greece and Turkey. It may also arise
in regard to Denmark and Norway, which have
not applied for membership but which might
possibly be invited in accordance with ArticleXI. Your Rapporteur has no intention of
assessing the respective merits of each of these
countries from the point of view of its accession
to WEU but wishes to recall the fundamental
questions thus raised which are not settled by the
treaty.
27. Depending on whether one opts for the
" European " or the * Atlantic " concept of WEU,
very different conclusions may be reached on
how enlargement should be envisaged. While the
accession of Portugal and Spain, members of
both the Community and the Atlantic Alliance,
raised no questions of principle, this is not so in
the other cases. Of the Community countries,
three do not belong to WEU: Ireland, Denmark
and Greece. Ireland does not belong to the
Atlantic Alliance and is showing no intention ofjoining it any more than WEU. There is obni-
ously no question of inviting it to do so and any
steps by WEU to encourage its candidature could
only be interpreted as an attempt to draw WEU
away from the alliance. Ireland's special position
is one reason why it is difficult to integrate
defence questions into the European Com-
munity. But it is a fact which has to be taken into
account. Denmarlg for its part, while a member
of the alliance, shows no intention of developing
military co-operation with members of the
alliance and, as long as it has not notified its wish
to do so, any approach to it would seem pre-
mature.
28. The case of Greece is obviously different
since it has applied to join WEU. It should be
noted, however, that its candidature raises diffi-
culties:
(a) relations between Greece and its
partners in the Atlantic Alliance havein recent years run into obstacles
because Greece does not seem to begving priority to the goals of the
alliillss in its force deployments, its
relations with its alliss, ia particular
the United States, or the conduct of its
diplomacy;
(b/ continued tension between Greece and
Turkey, members of the alliance, sug-
gests that, ifone ofthese countries has
subscribed to Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty, it might call on its
WEU partners to attain aims not
shared by the other members of the
organisation or, in any event, its
national ambitions might thereby be
enhanced;
(c) the relations which Greece seems to
wish to maintain with certain coun-
tries of the Middle East, including
some which, in recent years, have
obviously been weak in regard to ter-
rorism, already have a paralysing effect
on European political consultations. It
does not seem desirable to introduce
this factor of impotence into WEU;
(d) n any event, the means available to
WEU members for possible action in
the Eastern Mediterranean are not suf-
ficient for them to be able to subscribe
to Article V for the benefit of countries
in that region.
29. An " Atlantic " concepg moreover, means
sx4mining, apart from the cases of Denmark and
Greece, those of Norway, Turkey and, possibly,
Iceland. So far, the latter has shown little interest
in WEU which, for its part, does not have the
wherewithal to make a gignificalt contribution
to its security.
30. The case of Turkey, which has applied for
membership of WEU, is in a way similar to that
of Greece, with the sole difference that Turkey is
not a member of the European Community but
provides NATO with the largest army and makes
an essential contribution to western security.
Conversely, the Turkish Government has some-
times reacted to threats to its security by means
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that do not concord with the principles set out in
Article III of the modified Brussels Treaty.
31. Finally, Norway, which has not yet applied
for membership, clearly does not wish to be left
out of the building of Europe, just as it plays an
active part in the western defence system. Con-
sideration might therefore be given to inviting it
to join WEU if it confirmed its intention to
apply Articles I and II of the treaty. However, the
distance separating the most threatened areas of
Norwegian territory from the other WEU
member countries makes it doubtful whether the
latter would be able to subscribe to the commit-
ments provided for in Article V. It is mainly the
United States and Canada which ensure
Norway's security and it could hardly be other-
wlse.
32. For these reasons, your Rapporteur feels it
is impossible to enlarge WEU further in the near
future, on the one hand because this would mean
the nine present members agreeing on the nature
and vocation of WEU, apparently not now the
case, and on the other because it would weaken
the European pillar of the alliance that WEU
wishes to constitute. The Council answered the
Greek and Turkish applications in this sense at
the close of its meeting on 3rd April 1989.
33. In spite of this, the question is whether it
would be possible for these countries to take part
in some of WEU's activities, even if they do not
accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. There
has already been indirect participation insofar as
the Council informs the European member coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance of its work. Fur-
thermore, the 1955 decision setting up the
Standing Armaments Committee specified that
the agreements concluded under the aegis of that
body would be open to the other members of the
Atlantic Alliance, thus creating a precedent for
the Council's 'subsidiary bodies " referred to in
Article VIII of the treaty. Hence there is no
obstacle of principle to any of these countries
taking part in some of WEU's activities. It
remains to determine which. This obviously
depends on the future of these subsidiary
bodies.
34. The first thing that comes to mind is that
the Mediterranean countries members of the
Atlantic Alliance might take part in the Council's
Working Group on the Mediterranean. But that
would raise the problem, not yet solved, of
whether such a body is intended to prepare or
even possibly ensure the existence ofa European
security policy in that region, in which case the
participation of Greece and Turkey might block
such a policy, or whether it is intended fust to
strengthen NATO's action in the region, in
which case the participation of those two coun-
tries, if it led to no effective results, would have
few disadvantages.
IV. Creation of a European instinte
for advanced security stadies
35. Meeting in London on l6th March 1989,
the Presidential Committee adopted, in appli-
cation of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Procedure of the Assembly, Recommendation
467 callingfor the abolition of the WEU security
agencies and the creation of a * European
institute for advanced security studies " to
promote a European spirit in matters of defence.
This recommendation was communicated
immediately to the Council which, at its minis-
terial meeting on 3rd April, decided to instruct
the Permanent Council * to review the question
of an institute for strategic studies and the
related question of the WEU agency with a view
to a further discussion at its next meeting',
which is the first part of a reply to Recommen-
dation 467. At the joint meeting on 4th April, Sir
Geoftey Howe asked the Assembly to submit its
suggestions on the matter without delay and, the
same day, the Presidential Committee expressed
the wish that the General Alfairs Committee
submit a draft recommendation on the subject to
the Assembly at its next session. In view of its
urgency, preparation of this text had to be
assigned to a rapporteur who had already been
appointed and it was logical for it to be asso-
ciated with the report on the future of European
security.
36. Consideration must be given on the one
hand to the nature of the Assembly's proposal
and, on the other, to how it can help to solve the
problems raised.
37. The proposal to abolish the agencies stems
from the fact that the decision taken in 1985 to
set up three new agencies does not correspond to
WEU's requirements as it is now operating. By
instructing them to conduct studies determined
by the Council, the governments made them
annexes of the Secretariat-General and not fairly
independent agencies. They acknowledged this
when they made the Secretary-General respon-
sible for directing the agencies, when they
accepted the principle of their collocation with
the Secretariat-General and when, after abol-
ishing several posts in the agencies, they created
others in the Secretariat-General without
infringing the principle of global zero growth.
38. Creation of the institute is linked with
many proposals, each one quite different from
the others, made by governments or the
Assembly since 1984. For ease of comparison,
they may be placed in three groups:
39. (a) The proposal by Mr. Genscher, then
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to the
Assembly on 5th December 1984 to set up a
scientific institute for research in security and
defence matters. This proposal seems to have
given rise to some reservation insofar as an inter-
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governmental organisation with political aims,
or, a fortiori, a parliamentary institution for
open discussion, is hardly in a position to
sponsor a research institute in which freedom of
work and expression must be the rule. Con-
versely, the idea of promoting co-ordination of
existing research institutes in member countries
and collating and publishing information relating
to their specific work, without in any wayjeopardising their freedom, might help the views
ofEuropean research workers to be expressed in
this area. Furthermore, WEU might receive a
few research workers insofar as it has archives
open to the public and a library, which does not
apparenfly seem to be the case at present.
However, the fact that, on 3rd April 1989, the
Council referred to an institute for ' strategic "
studies indicates that it was taking as a reference
the International Institute for Strategic Studies in
London, thus approaching Mr. Genscher's pro-
posal.
40. (b) The proposal made by Mr. Rocard,
French Prime Minister, at the European session
of the French Institut des hautes 6tudes de
defense nationale on l5th November 1988 to
create a " European openness centre' was
worded as follows:
" The disarmament agreements form part
ofa global political process that is tending
to replace mistrust and confrontation with
dialogue and co-operation. Encouraging
openness where secrecy once reigned is
therefore more than desirable, it is nec-
essary to calm the international atmo-
sphere. Not everything can be said; much
can be done: for instance, information can
be exchanged on the organisation of
forces, defence budgets, military training
manuals and major weapons pro-
grammes.
Why should consideration not be given to
creating a European openness centre to
gather, circulate and explain information?
We must avoid becoming bogged down in
cumbersome procedure. Several tangible
solutions might be envisaged, including
attaching the openness centre to existing
institutes. "
Thus it would be a soft of documentation centre
with specialised staff and meaningful
data-processing means. It should have sufficient
resources to issue publications, regularly or not,
and to circulate them to the press and the public.
41. (c/ Another proposal made by Mr. Rocard
on lsth November 1988, on setting up a
European institute for advanced security studies,
was worded as follows:
* I wish a European institute for advanced
security studies to be set up, attached to
WEU by means to be defined. This would
allow WEU, which is still hesitating, to
find its way more easily. kt us therefore
start by allowing it to develop joint
thinking. The task of the institute would
be 6alning and teaching in order to
promote a spirit ofjoint defence and make
national public opinion aware of the
notion of collective European security. It
is not a question of standardising policies
but first ofencouraging the convergence of
our analyses. If we do not have common
grammar, how can we speak with one
voice? "
42. This last proposal is obviously the closest
to those made by our Assembly in Recommen-
dations 442 and, 463. lt was also referred to in
Recommendation 467 which uses Mr. Rocard's
words and specifies that the aim of the institute
would be to promote a European spirit in
matters of defence, but presumably, if the
Council used different words to describe the
institute whose creation it was asking the Per-
manent Council to re-examine, it was because
the Council did not want to be too closely linked
with this proposal.
43. The institute meets a need of which the
Assembly has long been aware. Peace in Europe
is indeed based on deterrence, which necessarily
has nuclear and conventional aspects but also a
psychological aspect. Deterrence is based both on
public determination and cohesion and on public
understanding of security requirements.- This
consensus is what is known as the spirit of
defence.
44. The Council and the Assembly aim to
promote a spirit of defence. For this purpose,
however, they must have an instrument capable
of assisting them in their effort to register public
opinion and to inform and shape it.
45. The problem is particularly delicate in
present circumstances since the West has at one
and the same time to be vigilant and take
advantage of the more favourable prospects
offered by Mr. Gorbachev's initiatives, seek
security at a lower level of armaments and
maintain a financial effort to ensure the effec-
tiveness of its defence, promote a European con-
sensus and safeguard Atlantic solidarity.
46. The Council cannot just inform the press
about its own activities. All who exercise
inlluence in society must be able to perceive
security problems since all society's activities are
linked with the nature of the security it is
afforded, just as that security stems from these
activities. The Council therefore has every
interest in ensuring that its action is accom-
panied by that of an institute which is not a mere
governmental instrument but whose indepen-
dence of governments ensures its authority.
47. The Assembly for its part relies on its
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions to promote its ideas in parliaments and the
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press. However, it also wishes to induce industri-
alists, the teaching profession, civil servants,journalists and military personnel to think about
European security matters and to examine
together the results of their thinking.
48. For this purpose, it organises colloquies,
but its resources are not equal to the magnitude
of its work. Its action would be enhanced if
backed by that of an institute calling on persons
who now assume, or are to assume, highJevel
responsibilities. This institute would allow them
to develop their thinking on Europe's security
and the problems of the alliance. It would
endeavour to promote awareness of European
solidarity in defence matters.
49. Such an instrument, designed to com-
plement the action of both the Council and the
Assembly, is defined briefly in Recommendation
467 on the creation of a European institute for
advanced security studies. Its status and
methods should be specified.
50. Your Rapporteur considers the French
Institut des hautes etudes de d6fense nationale
cannot be copied in toto for a European institute
because it is not at present possible to present to
a European public a body of defence doctrine
comparable to what France can offer and because
it is-not possible to mobilise European partici-
pants foi very long periods. Conversely, he
endorses the initiative ofconvening a European
session in the framework of the French institute,
as described in part VII of the thirty-fourth
annual report of the Council. In particular, he
welcomes the use of a national institute as a
framework for the European session, the con-
vening of participants from various sectors, be
they military or civilian officials, interested in
security matiers, the creation of an association of
alumni of European defence studies in Paris on
25th November 1988 and the support of the
WEU agency. It is gratifuing that Belgium is in
turn to host a further European session in 1989.
51. Training, the institute's vocation, is based
on thinking that itself implies adequate infor-
mation. T.his threefold r6le of informing,
thinking and training requires independence
which should be ensured by appropriate juridical
means.
52. Article vIII, paragraph 2, of the modified
Brussels Treaty would piovide the juridical basis
for creating sucn a body insofar as the notion of
" subsidiary' bodies of the Council is extremely
vague. It is obviously going too far to assimilate
these to * intergovernmental organs ", as is done
in the reply to Recommendation 463. A research
institute- should indeed retain some degree of
independence from political bodies if it is to be
able to provide objective information and
conduct independent thinking. However, it
cannot remain totally independent insofar as
WEU cannot allow just anything to be done in its
name and with its subsidiary bodies.
53. In this connection, a clear distinction must
be drawn between the tasks of the institute,
aimed at making public opinion aware of
security matters through action among p,ersons
with influence in wide-ranging spheres, and those
that the Council might assign to one or other
body to meet its own needs, such as examining
methods of applying space technology for the
verification of arms control and crisis man-
agement. Only the former tasks would be the
responsibility of the institute advocated !y tne
Asiembly, responsibility for the latter having 1o
remain with a body solely dependent on the
Council.
54. To ensure that the institute has the nec-
essary independence, it should be directed by an
administrative board on which all parties are
represented, composed of the Chairman-
ir-Office of the Council, the President of the
Assembly, the Secretary-General and the Clerk
with wh6m might be associated a small number
of persons, for instance one for each member
country. The latter might advantageously be rep-
resented by the director of a national institute
working on the same questions. This adminis-
trative 6oard would appbint a director-general of
the institute who would select his own limited
staff.
55. The institute would organise conferences
on general topics with quite a large 
-number ofpart--icipants and seminars on well-defined topics
with a-smaller number of participants. It would
also have the support of existing national insti-
tutes and ensure the continuity ofthe European
sessions organised bY the latter.
56. The r6le of a European institute for
security studies would include ensuring
co-ordination and continuity of national initia-
tives. Because ofthe short duration ofsessions, it
might be desirable to ensure that alumni are kept
regfuarly informed or are invited from time to
time to conferences or brief colloquies so that
they may update the information they obtained
from the sessions theY attended.
57. The basic documents for the discussions
would be drawn up by experts from the institute.
Proceedings of conferences and seminars would
be published. The institute would also serve as a
liaiion body with the association of alumni,
whose menibers would receive its publications.
58. As a subsidiary body of the Council within
the meaning of Artiile VIII, paragraph 3, of the
modified Brussels Treaty, the institute would be
financed by contributions from member coun-
tries included in the overall WEU budget. It
might benefit from income fromits publications,
thJassistance of member countries in organising
seminars and conferences and also, possibly,
external financial contributions. The Presidential
Committee recommendation does not imply an
institution with a large staff. On the contrary,
ll
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substantial savings might be made if the
organogram of such an institute is compared
with that of the WEU ministerial organs in Paris.
59. It would be appropriate for such an
institute to be located in the same premises as
the Assembly which might at one and the same
time benefit from regular exchanges with offi-
cials and participants in the institute and provide
it with material assistance in the form of meeting
rooms and general services. The library, docu-
mentation, translation, security and the man-
agement of the premises and staff might be
common to the two bodies, priority obviously
lariog to be given to the Assembly for every-
thing relating to the meeting rooms. The Offiie
of the Clerk might manage all the joint ser-
vrces.
60. Your Rapporteur does not claim to
propose a solution to all the problems that would
be raised by the creation ofsuch an institute, but
he feels that what he has said above would meet
a need recognised by the governments of most
member countries, on the condition, as several
committee members underlined, that this
institute remains small in size, staff and
budget.
Y. Second part of the thirty-founh
annual repor-t of the Council
61. In December 1988, the Assembly wel-
comed the fact that it was being kept better
informed than in the past about ihe eouncil's
acti\rities, in particular through the detailed
letters addressed to it by the Secretary-General at
roughly two-monthly intervals, which constitutes
an acceptable pace. It also appreciated discus-
sions with the Secretary-General, the
Chairmanship-in-Office and certain ministers
during sessions or at meetings before and after
ministerial meetings. Finally, it was pleased with
the speed at which replies to recommendations
and the annual report of the Council were com-
municated. On all these points, it can but
confirm its approval. However, it has noted that
speed was often accompanied by less concern to
give substantial, detailed or even accurate replies
to its recommendations.
62. As for the thirty-fourth annual report, it
notes, as it did in the case of the thirty-third,
that, while it gives useful information abbut the
Council's activities, it is not truly in keeping with
the statutory aspects it should embody. For
instance, unlike earlier reports, it does not give
detailed information on the number of meetings
at various levels or the activities of the Agency
for the Control of Armaments or the Standine
Armaments Committee, which is not even men-
tioned. Your Rapporteur had already com-plained about the references to those organs
being relegated to annexes to the thirty+hird
annual report. He wishes to complain even more
s-trongly that they no longer appear in the thtrty-
fourth. It is not that he attaches verv muih
importance to the activities of either of tirem but
he believes that, if the modified Brussels Treaty
is to be an instrument of effective deterrence, ii
is essential for the governments to respect abso-
lutely all the provisions to which they have sub-
scribed. Article IX of the treaty stipulates that
the Council shall make an annual report to the
Assembly * in particular " on the control of
armaments, exercised by the Agency for the
Control of Armaments. The annual report
merely implies in part VI, paragraph 2, that it
has accomplished " its residual tasks ". The
question of the control of chemical weapons is
now of such importance that it is worth speci-
foing what the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments has effectively achieved in that area. It is
lhis practice that gives it the necessary ability tofollow the Geneva negotiations in a us-eful
manner.
63. Should it be concluded from this omission
that the Agency for the Control of Armaments
and the Standing Armaments Committee failed
to submit a report to the Council on their activ-
ities in 1988? Are we to understand that they did
so and that the Council specifically took no
account of it? Your Rapporteur wonders, indeed,
whether the Council has not adopted a quite
deliberate tactic for avoiding the necessary
revision of the treaty by glossing over and soon
forgetting the application of provisions that it
considers outdated. The Assembly has constantly
opposed such procedure and it is one of the
rea-sgns why your Rapporteur wished to specift
which amendments to the treaty he befteved
desirable. Part II A, paragraph l, of the annual
report usefully recalls that the governments
believe it should be re-examined. As long as the
tgeaty has not been revised, it is the Assembly's
duty to insist that it be applied in full.
(a) Enlargement of WEU
64. The annual report tells the Assembly little
new as it had been duly informed on l4th
November of the arrangements made for the
accession of Portugal and Spain. However, there
is one point which, as far as your Rapporteur
knows, has never been made plain to the
Assembly. Although it has been told that Por-
tugal has undertaken to fulfil the commitments
under Article V and the platform of The Hagueby earmarking a brigade for deployment in
Northern Italy in case of need to take part in the
defence of its allies at their frontiers, the Council
has never informed the Assembly of the steps
Spain intends to take to assist its allies at their
frontiers.
t2
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65. Apart from this point, the Assembly can
but welcome Portugal and Spain's acceptance of
the principles defined in the platform and the
twin goals of WEU as usefully recalled in part II
A, paragraph 5. It will also welcome whatever
measures the Council takes to ensure the imme-
diate, full participation of Portugal and Spain in
its work. It likes to think that it will, without
delay, be given the wherewithal to accommodate,
in turn, and in an adequate manner, the parlia-
mentary delegations from those two countries.
66. Where the applications of Greece and
Turkey are concerned, the Assembly will note
that the annual report gives a satisfactory
account of the approaches made by those two
countries and the Council's answers. The guide-
lines issued to the press at the close of the
meeting of the Council of Ministers on 3rd April
1989 give useful details of these answers. Several
times the Assembly has expressed views similar
to those adopted by the Council and it can but
approve the measures laken to associate the two
countries with WEU'S activities without opening
the door to accession before the treaty has been
revised and the organisation restructured. It
notes that such an association, provided for only
in the case of arms co-production agreements
concluded under the aegis of the SAC, will be an
interesting legal innovation and compel the
Council to give its views on matters which it had
hitherto carefully avoided.
(b) Activitics of the Council
and its working groups
67. In 1987, your Rapporteur, noting diffi-
culties in identifuing the various transformations
taking place in the Council to which the annual
report then referred, tried, in Document 1l 17 of
4th November 1987, to present a picture of the
different bodies. The names given in the thirty-
fourth annual report give him the impression
that this picture is now out ofdate and he is once
again ignorant of the composition of each of the
intergovernmental meetings referred to in this
report and how regularly they meet. He learns
from part I, paragraph l, that the Permanent
Council is a valuable forum " for discussing
topical questions ", which is a novelty and
requires further comment, from part I, paragraph
5, that it is ' under the co-ordination of the Per-
manent Council'o that * the other working
groups " meet, which is far from clear, particu-
larly as it is stated in part III, paragraph l, that
the " enlarged Council " continues " to oversee
all the activities of the intergovernmental organs
of WEU ", whereas there is no longer any
mention of the " enlarged Council " constantly
referred to in 1987, and in part III, paragruph 4,
that it is o' under the authority of the Council "
itself that " the Special Working Group' meets,
having (part II, paragraph 3) been given instruc-
tions by * the ministers " and (part III, paragraph
8) worked " in close co-operation " with the
* Defence Representatives Group ". Conversely,
there is no longer any reference to the 'Special
Working Group at deputies level " or the " SDI
Working Group'. Do they still exi'st? Your
Rapporteur could give many such examples
which make it very difficult to explain'o the r6le
of WEU to public opinion " (part III, paragraph
9), as the Council claims to do. He asks the
Council to append to the fust part of the thirty-fifth annual report, for instance, a clear
organogram of the WEU intergovernmental
bodies, showing their composition and how
many times they meet each year. He wonders
what paragraph 6 of the reply to Recommen-
dation 463 means when it assimilates the inter-
governmental organs and Council meetings to
" subsidiary organs " of the Council as provided
for in Article VIII and, for some reason, Article
IX ofthe treaty, although they are not subsidiary
organs but merely delegations of the Council.
68. On the other hand, the thirty-fourth
annual report gives many useful indications, if
not about the conclusions, at least about the
nature of the work of some of these bodies. This
information is admittedly incomplete and the
Assembly is kept in the dark about the purpose
of the oo ten studies (which) have been mandated,
which will examine possibilities for specific new
European contributions to the common
defence " (part I, paragraph 2), just as it is about
who is to conduct them. Have they something in
common with the eight " themes of particular
interest " referred to in part III, paragraph 6?
However this may be, the titles of these themes
are of real interest to the Assembly as they can
help it to co-ordinate its own work with that of
the Council.
69. However, while part III, paragraph 7,
asserts that the Ministerial Council on 4th
November " approved all the recommendations
contained in the report (by the Special Working
Group) on giving effect to the platform ", Pdft
III, paragraph 8, states that the same working
group has begun 'work on the implementation
of the report's recommendations ", without any
time limit having been fixed for completing this
task, which is tantamount to saying that very
little has been done and swift progress should not
be expected towards agreement on implementing
the platform. The Assembly will be surprised
that the governments, which managed to reach
such rapid agreement on the wording of the
platform, i.e. on the principles governing WEU's
activities, and which made its acceptance the
essential condition for the accession of Portugal
and Spain to WEU, are proving incapable of
agreeing on its implications.
70. The Assembly will at least be gratified that
the Council underlines * the importance of
explaining the r6le of WEU to public opinion "
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(part III, paragraph 9), to which it had hitherto
paid little attention, apart from the remarkable
activities of the Secretary-General during his
four years in WEU. The Assembly was repre-
sented by the Chairman and several members of
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations at the seminar on 'o Changes in public
perceptions of European defence " held in
London on 6th and 7th March. This allowed its
representatives to recall that the media would be
interested in WEU only if the Council was active
and gave the Assembly detaile{ full information
on its work. The thirty-fourth annual report will
certainly convince no one of this. On the other
hand, members of the Assembly who attended
the joint meeting on 4th April were sorry not to
receive information about the ministerial
meeting until the day after the Chairman-in-
Office spoke to the press on this subject.
71. The Assembly will fully endorse the Coun-
cil's recognition of * the need for the West to be
ready with substantive proposals when the talks
opened " on limiting conventional weapons (part
III, paragraph I l). There is no doubt that many
observers now fear that detente may lead to de
facto disarmament through a reduction in the
defence budgets of the countries of the Atlantic
Alliance. Far from restoring a balance of arms
deployed by the two blocs, which the West
wishes to obtain at the Vienna negotiations, this
would make the negotiations more difficult
because the West would have litfle left to offer
where disarmament is concerned. This concern
was expressed by United States Congressman
Les Aspin, Chairman of the Defence Committee
of the House of Representatives, when speaking
to a group of French parliamentarians in Paris
on 6th April 1989, a fear that is perhaps not
unfounded.
72. In the Secretary-General's letter of 23rd
March, the Assembly was given detailed infor-
mation about the membership of the Defence
Representatives Group and found that it was
composed of both ministry officials and 
- 
for the
first time 
- 
a number of deputy chiefs-of-staff.
This suggests that the group has turned in a new
direction covering the deployrnent of member
countries' armed forces, but the annual report
says nothing about this.
73. Finally, the annual report says nothing
about the conclusions reached by the Mediter-
ranean Sub-Group. Whereas it refers only to the
Balkans and tle Maghreb, which do not at
present constitute major threats to international
peace, the Secretary-General's letter of 3rd Feb-
ruary says it also discussed the situation in
Libya, a country which has proved far more of a
threat. His letter of 23rd March does not confirm
this, but it points out that Cyprus has been
included in the agenda of the sub-group. None of
this very vague information gives any idea
whatever of which aspects of Mediterranean
problems the Council is studying. Clearly, the
accession ofPortugal and Spain and the applica-
tions from Greece and Turkey, even if the latter,
for the immediate future, results only in associ-
ation with some of the Council's activities, will
give the Council's work a more Mediterranean
turn. Does the reference to Cyprus mean the
Council has been helping to find a solution to the
problem raised by the de facto partition of the
island? Does the reference to Libya mean the
Council has looked at the Chad affair, Libya's
r6le in the spread of international terrorism, the
problems raised by its recent procurement of
long-range bombers capable of reaching
Southern Europe and its reported production of
chemical weapons? The annual report does not
answer these questions.
(c) Aaivitiu of the ministerial organs
74. As your Rapporteur has noted, part VII of
the annual report says nothing about the activ-
ities of the SAC and practically nothing about
those of the ACA. On the other hand, it gives
information about the work of the Agency for
Security Questions. According to the annual
report, its reports in 1988 provided technical
support for the Special Working Group and the
Defence Representatives Group on six topics.
None of these reports has been communicated to
the Assembly. It is not therefore in a position to
assess the existence and scale ofthe activities of
the Paris ministerial organs. Nor is it very con-
vinced by the assertion in the reply to Recom-
mendation 463that the classified nature of infor-
mation given in the reports explains why the
Council was unable to transmit any of them to
the Assembly.
75. The thirty-fourth annual report and the
Secretary-General's letters confirm that no
decision has yet been taken on the restructuring
of the WEU ministerial organs in the absence of
agreement on where they should be collocated
with the Secretariat-General. The purpose of
Recommendation 467 is to propose to the
Council a solution by abolishing the agency as an
independent body. The tasks it is given in fact
make it an annex of the Secretariat-General and
there seems to be no relevant reason for it to
remain separate. Conversely, the creation of an
institute, independent of the Council, would
allow the French Government's wishes to be met
by keeping a WEU organ in Paris and facilitate a
solution to the problems facing the Assembly
with the arrival of the Portuguese and Spanish
Delegations.
(d) Public relatioas
76. The Assembly is gratified that the Council
is at last paylng attention to the response to
WEU's activities among the press and public and
t4
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welcomes the steps it has taken in this sense.
However, it has to stress that these measures are
quite inadequate for everything not related to
ministerial meetings and, in particular, meetings
of the enlarged Council, the Special Working
Group and the Defence Representatives Group
are totally unknown to the public. The Assembly
is convinced that many of these meetings are not
so highly confidential as to be impossible to
reveal them to the press, in a communiqu6, for
instance.
(4 Siuaion in the Gulf
77. The Assembly gave its full backing to the
Council's steps to ensure freedom of navigation
in the Gulf as long as the war between lran and
Iraq lasted. However, the annual report seems to
draw a distinction between o'concerted action'
by member countries and the Cleansweep
demining operation that terminated it. Is it to be
deduced that the concerted action went further
than a mere mine-sweeping operation? The
Assembly has never been told so. This is not
without significance if one bears in mind the
letter from Mr. Younger quoted in the Secretary-
General's letter of 3rd February indicating that
the United Kingdom was withdrawing its mine-
sweepers from the Gulf but would keep other
warships there. Are other countries doing so,
too? Have they all withdrawn their
mine-sweepers? Finally, by noting that this
action " is a useful precedent " for the future, the
Council attributes quite new significance to
Article VIII of the treaty, since that implies that
the WEU Council effectively examines any
threats to international peace arising outside the
area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty
without this examination necessarily resulting in
military action. For instance, this should now
lead it to examine the situation in kbanon.
(l) Relations with the Assembly
78. Subject to the reservation expressed by
your Rapporteur in the introduction to this
report and the lack of substance and rigour in the
replies to recommendations and in the thirty-
fourth annual report, it must be noted that rela-
tions between the Council and the Assembly
have improved considerably in recent years
thanks to the swifter transmission of replies to
recommendations, the participation, for the first
time, in 1989 of members of the Assembly in a
seminar organised by the Council, continued
meetings with the Chairmanship-in-Office of the
Council before and after each ministerial
meeting an4 above all, the Secretary-General's
letters to the President of the Assembly.
79. The Secretary-General's letters to the Pres-
ident of the Assembly have indeed been a very
useful complement to the information given in
the annual report. In certain respects, they have
filled the gaps in the report, in particular by
giving essential explanations of institutional
notions that are quite obscure in the report itself,
such as that of " enlarged Council' and
" Defence Representatives Group ". But if the
Council wishes the documents it produces to
have any impact on public opinion, it must
ensure that they are comprehensible on their
own. With a view to the forthcoming departure
of Mr. Cahen from the Secretariat-General and
his replacement by Mr. van Eekelen, your
Rapporteur wishes to underline a few aspects of
these letters which have been of valuable
assistance in the Assembly's work:
- 
the analysis of the Secretary-General's
political contacts in the United States in
November 1988 and the conclusions he
drew about the security policy of the
new administration (letter of 3rd Feb-
ruary);
- 
the detailed description of the
approaches made by Greece and Turkey
with a view to joining WEU and the
Council's reactions;
- 
details about the end of the operationsin the Gulf. However, in this con-
nection, your Rapporteur wishes to
record his disagreement with the
expression used by Mr. Younger and
quoted in the letter of 23rd March about
the * area of the modified Brussels
Treaty ". He recalls that Article VIII of
the treaty asks the Council to hold con-
sultations on any threat to peace 'in
whatever area this threat should
arise ";
- 
the chronological list of disarmament
undertakings by countries of the two
pacts (letter of 23rd March);
- 
quotations from remarks made by min-
isters to the Presidential Committee on
l6th March 1989, the only means for
the Assembly as a whole to be informed
of what is said at such meetings;
- 
the analysis of the seminar held
London on 6th and 7th March
" Changes in public perceptions
European defence ".
80. This is not an exhaustive list. Your
Rapporteur wonders whether such letters could
not also give information about documents or
reports prepared by the WEU agency or by the
Council's working groups which the latter refuses
to transmit to the Assembly because of the clas-
sified nature of some of the information they
contain. For instance, it would be useful for the
Assembly to be better informed about the con-
clusions of the Special Working Group on the
implications of the platform adopted in The
in
on
of
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Hague and on the work of the Mediterranean
Sub-Group.
81. In any event, the Assembly thanks the Sec-
retary-General for what he has done to keep it
informed of the Council's activities and trusts
that his successor will follow the course thus
started by extending it further since this is the
only way to promote, without too much loss of
time, a really useful dialogue on the Council's
activities with all members of the Assembly.
VI. Conclusions
82. The colloquy which the General Affairs
Committee organised in Florence allowed
present WEU activities, its enlargement and the
revision of the modified Brussels Treaty to be
placed in the wider framework of the prospects
of European security now that the western
defence system has to be adapted to a new situ-
ation. Not all the aspects of this newly-composed
European enyironment are yet known. The new
United States administration, which has taken
some time to complete its nominations in the
defence sector, has still not indicated the courseit intends to follow in the country's security
policy. The words of Mr. Gorbachev and the
Soviet leaders, their disarmament proposals and
their unilateral initiatives to reduce the level of
their forces have so far had only partial results.
Where its own future is concerned, the European
Community is faced with choices that it is hesi-
tating to make.
83. Your Rapporteur therefore believes the
time has not yet come to take drastic measures
for the future of European security. On the con-
trary, Western Europe must retain every possi-
bility of helping to ward off an external threat
that has not disappeared, play a useful part in
negotiations to reduce the level of forces
deployed in Europe and help to establish a new
international order.
84. It is because the modified Brussels Treaty
has, for thirty-five years, been one ofthe founda-
tions of the policy of deterrence pursued by the
Atlantic Alliance that its essential provisions
must be safeguarded and, above all, its credi-
bility maintained. This is what the Assembly has
constantly been asking the Council to do, urgng
it to apply the treaty in full or revise it. Withoui
denying the Councilos sincere desire to meet the
Assembly's wishes, of which there is ampleproof, the thirty-fourth annual report never-
theless discloses a certain degree of carelessness
among the governments, which seem to be
respecting their collective undertakings less strin-
gently than in the past. Today, it is mainly
against this tendency that we must react,
recalling that d6tente must not be the result of
apathy but of a renewal of mutual confidence.
Scrupulous respect for the treaties is the first con-
dition for this confidence.
Panr Two
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty
85. The accession of Portugal and Spain to
WEU makes it essential to revise the modified
Brussels Treaty. In point of fact, a revision had
already become necessary since most controls of
armaments were abolished in 1985 and the WEU
Council's activities took on new dimensions as
from October 1984. In a way, the platform
adopted in The Hague was not quite a revision of
the treaty but a reorientation of WEU to take
account of the fact that the situation in 1987 was
no longer at all the same as in 1948 or 1954 andit had become essential to define European
security requirements in new terms. Portugal and
Spain seem to have acceded to WEU far more on
the basis of the platform, to which they have
both subscribed, than of the treaty. This pro-
duced a not very satisfactory situation since the
two new members of WEU had at one and the
same time to subscribe to a treaty which, on the
one hand, was not wholly and directly applicable
to them and, on the other, was due to be revised
in the very near future.
86. The platform adopted in The Hague raises
and solves a number of questions that are
important for the activity of reactivated,
enlarged WEU. But there are many others that it
does not cover and which still come under the
modified Brussels Treaty, although that treaty
has not been applied satisfactorily for a long
time. This situation is unacceptable because the
modified Brussels Treaty is an essential part of
the policy of deterrence and defence defined in
the platform. The fact that it is not, or not fully,
applied detracts from its credibility as an inter-
national act and consequently weakens signifi-
cantly its deterrent value. ft is therefore essential
for the revision to take account of present real-
ities in order to restore the unanimity of its sig-
natories on the principles ofa collective security
policy.
87. There is accordingly no doubt that the
nature and extent of the treaty revision are
dividing member countries, some of them con-
sidering WEU to be more of a first form of
security system for a future European union or,
in other words, a sort of new European Defence
Community, destined to be rapidly merged with
the other European Community institutions,
whereas others prefer to consider it mainly as a
Soup of European members of the Atlantic
Alliance that is intended to strengthen NATO.
Finally, some committee members expressed the
opinion that the Council of Europe and the Com-
munity in parallel should form the embryo of
a politically and democratically integrated
Europe.
88. (a) ln the first hypothesis, Europe will
have to become integrated if it is to survive in a
world that is moving rapidly towards increas-
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ingly strong competition between ever larger eco-
nomic and political entities. This is necessary in
particular if Europe wishes to remain in every
aspect ofthe techological tace." Europe" is not
only Europe of the Twelve, but the Community
is the only embryo of a democratic and inte-
grated federal Europe. Economic integration is
but one stage in the historical process that
requires true political integration. In the twenty-
first century, can there possibly be a single
market without a single currency, without a
single financial and fiscal system, and hence a
central bank, or a single economic - and social -
policy? Inherently, economic integration leads
inevitably to political integration and, conse-
quently, brings out the need for a common
foreign policy and, in the long run, a common
security policy. This is where revitalised,
enlarged WEU comes in. Since the military
aspects of security policy cannot be handled in
the Community - which in fact prevents any
security question being tackled adequately -
there is at present no choice but to do this else-
where and between those members of the Com-
munity which are truly prepared to accord them
serious attention. The only forum in which these
countries come together is WEU, whose
founding treaty has the same aim of integration
as the European Community. A process of con-
vergence between WEU and the Community
should therefore emerge which mlght possibly
lead to identical membership of the two
organisations and the incorporation of WEU's
progress in the Community, in a manner that
obviously cannot be specified today. This would
in no way be in contradiction with the existence
of the Atlantic Alliance in which only the
internal balance offorces would change because
of the existence of a unffied European partner.
89. From a Community point of view, inte-
gration would naturally imply the creation of an
integated European force. The major difficulty
in the distant future would then be to solve the
question of deciding on the possible use of
nuclear weapons as long as there is no single,
centralised European political power.
90. This concept calls for detailed, ambitious
planning of WEU's work. It would be a question
of gradually establishing a process of political
and military integration of member states, in
parallel with the process of political integration
in the Community. Initially, changes would be
slighl na6 just a stage in a progressive process
and not the ultimate aim to be attained. Com-
munity membership would be essential for any
country applyrng to join WEU, together with
accession to Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty, the Rome declaration and the platform
adopted in The Hague. Moreover, this would
mean paying very close attention to the condi-
tions required of any country applyrng to join the
European Community since the possibility
would have to be preserved for a true conver-
gence between WEU and the European Com-
munity. From this point of view, the Commu-
nity's response to any application from Austria
would be significant.
91. (b/ Conversely, under the second concept,
Western Europe's security being ensured by the
Atlantic Alliance, WEU's only r6le would be as
an instrument for strengthening the alliance. In
this concept, WEU would in the long run be
merely a European sub-group of the alliance, a
* Eurogroup " distinguished from the model by
the fact that it grouped not only the defence min-
isters of member countries but also the ministers
for foreign affairs, that France belonged to it and
that the members of WEU would be a little more
" militant' and homogenous. WEU's principal
aim would then merely be to strengthen the
alliance. The fact that it also served European
integration would be secondary. Moreover, ele-
mentary principles of economy and efficiency
advocate avoiding duplication of work that may
or must be effected in the alliance. WEU would
therefore have to limit itself to being a mere
gathering of the most " ardent " European allies
who are the most aware of the need for Euro-
peans to assume a grcaher share of risks, burdens
and r6les. There is no danger ofthis concept of
WEU worrying Washin$on or Moscow. For the
Soviet Union, a true common European house
would probably be free of military alliances with
the United States. But if this is not possible, it
will be preferable to maintain two structured alli-
ances so that the bilateral dialogue between the
United States and the Soviet Union can be
decisive. Nor would this second approach be
unacceptable to Washinglon, which is and con-
siders itself to be the alliance's natural leader and
expects its loyal European allies not to com-
plicate security matters: its own and European
security are far too serious.
92. In general, this concept implies that, at
political level, WEU member countries must try
to harmonise their views on security matters,
with due regard for the allinnss and avoiding
making WEU a nucleus that might be embar-
rassing for the other allies and compromise the
principle of the indivisibility of western security.
At mflitarv level, the principle of non- dupli-
cation would be essential. What could not be
done in the alliance, but which might be useful
for the allied defensive system, would be done in
WEU and, to a certain extent, WEU would be
used to allow a rapprochement between
members not integrated militarily in the alliance
and those which are. All this would probably also
be useful for European integration since it would
foster the political and military harmonisation of
the WEU member countries. In this event, in
order to apply for membership of WEU it would
be essential to be a European country and
member of the Atlantic Alliance. Any allied
European country prepared to subscribe to
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Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, the
platform adopted in The Hague and the Rome
declaration would be a legitimate candidate.
93. Your Rapporteur believes 
- 
but some
committee members found this view unduly pes-
simistic 
- 
that presenting the Council with such
a choice, which it has in fact had to face up to
since France rejected the EDC in 1954, is tanta-
mount to condemning WEU to the uncertainty,
delay and obstruction that it has constantly had
to grapple with over the past thirty-five years. It
should be possible to reconcile most aspects of
these two points of view around a few guiding
ideas. This is moreover what the Council sug-
gests in part II, paragraph A 5, ofits thirty-fourth
annual report, which refers to the " dual
objective " of WEU.
94. (a) The Atlantic Alliance remains the
essential guarantee ofEuropean security and any
steps taken by Europe must seek to strengthen it
or, at least, prevent it from becoming weaker.
95. (b) The European union will have to asso-
ciate a European security policy with the exis-
tence of a European Communiry.
96. (c) lt is not yet possible to determine accu-
rately the geographical limits or institutional
structures of a future European union. It is not
certain that its responsibilities will be identical in
security and economic matters and initiatives
taken today must not prejudge the solution
found to these two questions.
97. (d) The parliamentary aspect of the
problems cannot be settled without account
being taken of the other aspects. There would be
no point in assigning prerogatives to an assemblyif it had no means of exercising them effec-
tively.
98. On the basis of these ideas, your
Rapporteur has made the following analysis of
the changes which should be made to the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. Some committee members
recalled that it was for the governments to take a
decision on this matter. This is undeniable, the
Assembly's r6le being merely to make sugges-
tions. However, if it wishes to play this r6le, it
must express its opinion here and now, i.e.
before the Council organs have gone too far in
preparing a text. Since other bodies, less
authorised than the Assembly to give their views
on the matter, including the European Par-
liament, have not hesitated to do so, the least
that could be said is that it would be curious if
the Assembly did nothing.
99. It should be noted that, according ro the
Secretary-General's letter to the President of the
Assembly dated 23rd March, the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, Sir Geoffrey Howe, told
the Presidential Committee on l6th March 1989
that the revision of the treaty now being pre-
pared by the Council "does not aim to change
the substance of the treaty but simply to remove
certain provisions which are now obsolete ",
which apparently limits the revision to ArticleVIII and Protocols Nos. II, III and IV. Sir
Geoffrey Howe also announced that " the
Assembly will be regularly consulted on this
matter as the work progresses ". This statement
must be duly noted. Your Rapporteur considers
these words to be an encouragement to set out
here and now his views on the changes that
might be made, which does not mean that he
would not be satisfied with a far more limited
revision. In the first stage, at least, the aim is to
identif what it is essential to revise and those
parts of the reaty which must not be touched.
Subsequently, it would still be possible, as
certain committee members asked, to make a
more detailed analysis of the new elements
which might, in one form or another, usefully be
added to the undertakings already entered into
by member countries.
Articlcs I to III
100. These articles date back to the 1948 treaty.
Articles II and III have remained as they were.
The amendments to Article I under Article II of
Protocol No. I of the 1954 Paris Agreements in
no way jeopardise the fundamental intention of
the contracting parties. This was to link the
defensive alliil1ss, the very subject of the treaty,
closely with a European plan extending much
further than the security field and attaining a
global dimension, since it includes:
(a/ Organisation and co-ordination of
member states' economic activities.
This co-operation " will be effected
through the Council refeted to in
Article VIII " but * shall not involve
any duplication of... the work of other
economic organisations" in which
member states are represented, but
shall * assist the work of those
organisations ". It should be stressed
that this article has constantly been
applied satisfactorily in relations
between WEU and the European Com-
munity. It guided the Council's activ-
ities until the accession of the United
Kingdom to the EEC and, since then,
it has been applied to the benefit of the
Community in areas for which it is
responsible.
(b) Aa undertaking to * develop on corre-
sponding lines the social and other
related services of their counties...
both by direct consultation and in
specialised agencies ".
(c) A decision " to lead their peoples
towards a better understanding of the
principles which form the basis of their
l8
DOCUMENT I185
common civilisation and to promote
cultural exchanges ". This decision is
not insignificant since it links mem-
bership of WEU with respect for
certain principles, which obviously
include human rights. It helps to asso-
ciate WEU with the Council of
Europe's activities since its creation, as
certain committee members under-
lined.
101. Noting that these elements have never
appeared, or no longer appear, among the WEU
Council's activities, some believe that these three
articles should be deleted when the treaty is
revised. Your Rapporteur has quite the opposite
opinion, since:
lO2. (i) The Council does not have to handle
these matters directly as long as other
organisations deal with them, as is the case of the
Eulopean Community for the first point, the
Council of Europe for the third and both for the
second. In the case of cultural and social ques-
tions, only the exercise of the WEU Council's
responsibilities was transferred to the Council of
Euiope by a decision of the Ministers for Foreign
Affaiis in April 1959. In the case of economic
responsibilities, no special act was necessary
sinie Article I of the treaty provides for such a
transfer to avoid duplication. In actual fact, the
matter was settled the day the United Kingdomjoined the European Communities since eco-
nomic matters were withdrawn from the agenda
of WEU Council meetings. Thus, retaining these
articles involves no risk of duplication or even of
rivalry between European institutions.
103. (iy' Conversely, Articles I, II and III have
the merit of associating WEU with other
organisations responsible for such matters' In
particular, it should be noted that the act of
accession ofPortugal and Spain is based on these
articles since, in the fifth paragraph of the pre-
amble to that act, it is stressed that, inter alia, it
is because Portugal and Spain " are fully com-
mitted to the process of European construction'
that they have been admitted to WEU. However,
the Council did not explicitly make this com-
mitment a condition of the accession of new
countries to WEU.
104. (iiz/ Furthermore, these articles just!ff 1[
actual or possible co-operation between WEU
organs and the Community and the Council of
Europe, for instance between the WEU Assembly
and the European Parliament and the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
105. (iv/ These articles also explain the decision
taken by the Council, but not always satisfac-
torily applied, to agree to its dialogue with the
Assembly covering application of the treaty as a
whole, even if its responsibilities are exercised by
other organisations.
106. (v) Hence, it is possible to resort to these
articles should institutions larger than WEU not
manage to solve problems that the Nine could
tackle in the framework of WEU, in particular in
the event of a crisis in relations between
members of those institutions. The question
does not seem to arise at present, but why should
we deprive ourselves of a means which may one
day be usefril if there is nothing against it?
107. (vi) Article III of the treaty also provides a
legal basis for a possible solution to questions
recently raised by the Council. Thus, on 15th
November 1988, when Mr. Rocard proposed cre-
ating a European institute for advanced security
studies " to allow European awareness of security
matters to take shape progressively with the pos-
sibility of giving birth to a true European stra-
tegic iulture ", he said he believed this institute
sh-ould be " linked to WEU in accordance with
methods to be defined ", which would in effect
be an application of Article III.
108. Your Rapporteur therefore considers it
desirable for Articles I, II and III ofthe treaty to
be retained, with the exception of the section of
Article I which refers to " the necessity of uniting
to promote the economic recovery of Europg"..
This recovery occurred a long time ago and it
mryht now b6 possible to speak of " the necessity
oflompleting the economic union of Europe"-
But this is a minor detail.
Afiicle IV
109. This article dates back to 1954 and is the
basis of co-operation between WEU and NATO.It is essential in many respects, in particular
because it links countries which are not subject
to NATO integated command. It has not always
produced all the results the Seven hoped for
insofar as NATO has often refused to provide
information requested by the WEU agencies with
effect from the time the latter were asked to
prepare studies. Admittedly a seven- or nine-
power decision, whatever it may be, cannot
Lommit a larger organisation. But the North
Atlantic Council, in its Resolution of 22nd
October 1954, said of the Paris Agreements that
all the member countries " hereby record their
agreement v/ith the provisions of these protocols
and documents insofar as they concern action by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation'. This
constitutes an obligation to respond to requestsfor information transmitted by the WEU
Council.
110. On the other hand, this article took on
greater political importance when France
witndrew from the NATO integrated commands.
It justifies the articles about the r61e of the
AtlLntic Alliance in the platform adopted in The
Hague and explains the Seven's attitude when
negbtiations were started with Spain. They
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delayed the negotiations until the dispute
between Spain and NATO or the United States
had been settled. This article is therefore a guar-
antee against any tangent which mlght divert
WEU away from NATO and your Rapporteur
considers it essential to maintain it in full evenif, in fact, the very real co-operation between
NATO and the WEU Council in applying the
protocols has shortcomings in the case of coun-
tries outside the integrated mililary commands.
Article Y
l1l. Article V has been the very basis of the
Brussels Treaty since 1948 and of European
co-operation in security matters. To interfere
with this article would be to call in question not
only European co-operation in security matters
but also the existence of a European Community
that would be deprived of all meaning without
the full solidarity of its members in face of
external threats. Your Rapporteur merely wishes
to recall that the French word * agression " is not
an accurate translation of the English word
* attack " and that the two texts should be
aligned. The English word, which excludes all
possibility of one of its members contesting the
unprovoked nature of an' attack ', which would
make it ala' agressioz ', seems preferable to the
French word, which leaves room for such an
argument. What your Rapporteur is asking is
not, strictly speaking, a modification of the treaty
but merely the correction of an error in the
alignment of rwo texts dating back to 1948.
Moreover, this interpretation conforms with the
text of the platform adopted in The Hague which
specifies that the signatories intend to o ensure
that our determination to defend any member
country at its borders is made clearly manifest by
means of appropriate arrangements'.
Articlcs YI and VII
ll2. These articles seem to be corollaries to
Article V and call for no change.
Atticlc YIII
113. This is obviously the most important
article in peacetime since it determines the
nature and composition of the Council and
guides its work.
ll4. Paragraph .I seems to fit present require-
ments perfectly, especially as it associates the
treaty with European co-operation as a whole.
115. Since the reactivation of WEIJ, para-
graph 2 has been applied in an interesting
manner because it justifies the proliferation of
intergovernmental meetings through the
Council. Furthermore, the Council's vocation to
set up * subsidiary bodies'l whose links, other
than budgetary, with the Council, and hence
their status, are not fixed in a rigid manner,
leaves the door open for the creation ofvarious
bodies, for instance:
(a) in 1954, the Agency for the Control of
Armaments, a body independent of
the governments and the Council in
the implementation of its tasks but run
administratively by the Council;
(b) in 1955, the Standing Armaments
Committee, an intergovernmental
organisation with a secretariat pro-
vided by WEU;
(c) since 1985, three agencies closely
dependent on the Council for the
implementation of their tasks and their
management;
(d) any new body such as a European
institute for advanced security studies
mryht possibly, on this basis, be set upin WEU, as Mr. Rocard proposed,
without it necessarily being placed
strictly under the authority of the
Council.
I 16. Paragraph 3, which had never been
invoked before 1987, was applied for the
co-ordinated operation by member countries in
the Gul[ thereby receiving new justification thatis particularly important as it specifies the
worldwide responsibility which the treaty assignsto the WEU Council, whereas the Atlantic
Alliance has only regional responsibilities. It
therefore seems essential to maintain it.
ll7. Paragraph 4 admittedly has the disad-
vantage of making all Council decisions, apart
from those relating to arms control, subjeci to
the unanimity rule. Your Rapporteur would like
the governments to agree to procedure that
makes it less difficult to take collective decisions,
but doubts whether they would be prepared to do
so.
118. References to the application of Protocols
Nos. II, III and IV in paragraphs 2 and 4 will
obviously have to be adapted to the decisions
taken in regard to those protocols.
ll9. Furthermore, Article III (a) 4 of the
plalfgrm adopted in The Hague contains a fairly
satisfactory definition of what the governments
are prepared to do to ensure application of the
treaty. The question arises of whether it is
desirable to include this programme in Article
VIII of the treaty or to make it a new protocol
together with the rest of the platform. Your
Rapporteur considers that, subject to the nec-
essary changes of form, this article should be
included among the obligations the member
countries imposed on the Council under ArticleIrIII.
20
DOCUMENT I I85
Atticle IX
120. This article, dating back to 1954, is the
basis for the Assembly's existence and is now
subject to much criticism, but not convergent,
that may be summarised as follows:
l2l. (a) The fact that the representatives of the
member nations of WEU to the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe form the
Assembly has two drawbacks:
(y' these representatives, who already
have heavy commitments in the
Council of Europe as well as their
duties as national parliamentarians,
also have to bear the burden of work
in the WEU Assembly;
(ii) the delegations to the Council of
Europe are not necessarily composed
of parliamentarians who are the most
interested in security and defence
questions, which are essential in
WEU.
122. Prior to the existence of the European
Community, the intention of the signatories of
the treaty was obviously to form a group of rep-
resentatives particularly concerned by European
affairs in each national parliament. This was
quite justified at a time when a European ideal
had not yet taken root but is less so today
because the Community has its own parliament
and public opinion and national parliamen-
tarians are far more aware of European realities
than were their predecessors in 1954. Hence the
proposal to modifu Article IX to separate the del-
egations to the two assemblies. The following
text might be considered, for instance:
" The Council of Western European Union
shall make an annual report on its activ'
ities to an assembly composed of represen-
tatives of the parliaments of the Brussels
Treaty powers. "
123. (b) The fact that the common vocation of
the European Community on the one hand and
of WEU on the other, recoCnised by all member
states for the past seventeen years, is the estab-
lishment of a European union has led to pro-
posals that, when the modified Brussels Treaty is
revised, the words ' to the Consultative Assembly
of the Council of Europe " be replacedby * to the
European Parliament ' so as to prepare for a
union of European parliamentary assemblies
even before there is a union of governmental
institutions.
124. An obstacle is that members of the
European Parliament have powers only in the
framework of the treaty conferring them, i.e. the
treaties whose merger is the basis of the Com-
munity. Members of the European Parliament
therefore have no power over the governments of
member countries since the election of the
European Parliament by direct universal suf-
frage. Yet these governments are still the only
possible interlocutors for parliamentarians in
areas not explicitly within the Community's
responsibilities. Consequently, better than
members of the European Parliament, national
parliamentarians can take effective action on
matters relating to the application of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. The WEU Assembly would
lose much of its influence in areas for which it
has exclusive responsibility if this proposal were
followed up as matters now stand.
125. (c/ Noting this situation, the European
Parliament, which has been considering the
matter for a long time, is soon to examine a
report whose preliminary draft contained a pro-
posal to have the WEU Assembly formed of a
mix of national and European parliamentarians.
It may be wondered what gives the European
Parliament, including representatives of coun-
tries which are not members of WEU, compe-
tence to give its views on the modified Brussels
Treaty. One way or another, such a solution
would have the very serious drawback of basing
the powers of members of the WEU Assembly on
different principles, which would weaken the
Assembly by detracting from its representa-
tiveness. Your Rapporteur considers such a pro-
posal cannot be endorsed.
126. Your Rapporteur wishes to stress that, as
the General Affairs Committee has already
pointed out on several occasions, a federation or
confederation of states always has a two+hamber
parliament, one representing the union, the other
the federal or confederal entities. It would
therefore seem logical to consider a future
European union with such a parliament, with
one chamber emanating from the European Par-
liament, the other from national parliaments,
each having prerogatives corresponding to the
nature of the federation or confederation. He
therefore sees no need to interfere with the
present parliamentary system other than to sep-
arate the delegations to the WEU Assembly from
those to the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe without, of course, excluding
the possibility of dual membership.
127. On the other hand, the words ' and in par'
ticular concerning the control of armaments"
should be deleted since this is no longer an
important part of the Council's work, it being
accepted that, in the 1954 text, what was meant
was the control to be exercised by the Agency set
up under Protocol No. IV. The thirty-fourth
annual report of the Council anticipates such a
deletion, which implies that it will easily be
adopted by the governments.
Artiole X
128. While noting Spain's reservation in regard
to Article X and those of the Federal Republic
and Italy in 1954, your Rapporteur has no reason
2t
DOCUMENT 1 I85
to think that these reservations, accepted by the
other member countries, are liable to affect the
drafting of this article and he sees no reason to
modifu it.
Article XI
129. Article XI as it now stands has the
drawback of not speciffing which states may be
invited to accede to the treaty. Do they have to
be members of the Atlantic Alliance? Article IV
appears to make this necessary but then it would
be better to speciff this so as to avoid a mis-
guided request to accede. Do they have to be
members of the European Community? Article I
and the de facto transfer of the exercise of the
Council's economic responsibilities to the
European Community make this desirable, but
the fact that the United Kingdom was able to be
a member of WEU before joining the EEC shows
that it is not a necessity. Finally, this article
should speciff to what extent the subsidiary
bodies of the Council provided for in Article
VIII, paragraph 3, can be open to certain coun-
tries which have not acceded to the modified
Brussels Treaty and in what conditions. The can-
didatures of Greece and Turkey and the answers
the Council gave those countries make this
problem highly topical. Your Rapporteur will set
out later in this document his views on possible
further enlargements of WEU, but he has to note
here that Article XI leaves open too many ques-
tions of principle, thus creating much ambiguity
about the true nature and vocation of WEU.
However, to modify it would have the disad-
vantage of making a choice between the two con-
cepts of WEU referred to above and opposing
member countries. Your Rapporteur is very
doubtful whether the governments are at present
prepared to make such a choice.
Artirb XII
130. This article involves no particular political
difficulty, but the second paragraph has given
rise to speculation as a result of which certain
points need to be specified. The paragraph lays
down that the treaty * shall enter intoforce on the
date of the deposit of the last instrument of rattfi-
cation and shall thereafter remain in force for
fifiy years ", at which time each high contracting
party shall have the right to cease to be a party
thereto provided that he shall have previously
given one year's notice of denunciation. Some
have concluded that the treaty was valid for only
fifty years as from 1948, since this article was
already included in the 1948 Brussels Treaty.
l3l. This does not take account ofthe fact that
the modified Brussels Treaty is not the Brussels
Treaty but a new treaty with other signatories
that was renegotiated and ratified. Protocol No. I
of the Paris Agreements merely uses the text of
the Brussels Treaty as a frame for the new treaty
and the fifty-year period should start from the
last ratification of the Paris Agreements, which
means that no signatory of these agreements is
authorised to denounce the treaty before 6th
May 2005. On 14th November 1988, the nine
governments recognised this fact in the first par-
agraph of the protocol of accession of Portugal
and Spain, which states that the words 'the
treaty " refer to the 1948 Brussels Treaty ' as
modified and completed by the protocol signed
at Paris on 23rd October 1954 and the other pro-
tocols and annexes which form an integral part
thereof".
132. Whether or not a new treaty is drawn up
or there is merely to be an amended version of
the old one will depend on the kind of amend-
ments made to these protocols following the
accession of Portugal and Spain.
Protocols Nos. II, III and IV
133. By deleting the lists of armaments annexed
to Protocol No. III in 1985, the governments in
fact removed the substance of these protocols. By
maintaining the protocols themselves, they
showed that they abided by certain principles.
Consideration must now be given to how these
principles will apply in the Europe of future
decades. Your Rapporteur will not therefore
analyse the details of the various protocols but
simply underline the principles that are still valid
and determine to what aims they might hence-
forth be applied.
134. Protocol No. II has a rwofold aim: first, to
limit the level of forces of the continental coun-
tries in Europe and, second, to oblige the United
Kingdom to maintain specific levels of armed
forces on the mainland of Europe. In present cir-
cumstances, the first aim is no longer a matter of
concern to any member, whereas the second
retains its full importance. Conversely, appli-
cation of Article V of the treaty makes it binding
on all member countries to maintain sufficient
force levels to be able, if necessary, to intervene
on behalf of any of their allies that are the object
of an attack. Finally, by counting, when calcu-
lat'ng the forces taken into consideration, only
those placed under NATO integrated command
and " internal defence and police forces ', Pro-
tocol No. II makes no provision for the case of
non-integrated national forces. Today, however,
this is the case ofFrench and, to a certain extent,
Portuguese and Spanish forces which might con-
tribute to the defence of the central front. During
the negotiations for its accession, Portugal
undertook to maintain a brigade available for
deployment in Northern Italy in case of crisis,
but SACEUR is not as a result empowered to
report on the level of Portuguese forces.
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135. Your Rapporteur therefore considers
that:
(a/ it would be desirable for each WEU
member country to undertake to
maintain a certain level of forces
available with a view to application of
Article V of the treaty;
(b) the minimum level of these forces
should be the subject of agreement
between member countries;
(c) theil. real level should be monitored so
as to guarantee application of the
treaty;
(d) these requirements imply the inclusion
of a new category in Protocol No. II,
i.e. * forces under national command
earmarked for joint defence purposes - ,
minimum levels being fixed by joint
agreement for each member country
and subject to declaration and verifi-
cation;
(e) thts would imply a radical modifi-
cation of Protocol No. II designed
henceforth to maintain a certain level
of forces at the service of the joint
defence of Western Europe;
ff) thrs modification is essential if one
country, the United Kingdom, is not to
be the only one subject to specific, dis-
criminatory commitments in regard to
the maintenance of its forces in the
Federal Republic, which means that
there is now no longer a balance
between the commitments imposed on
that country and those of its conti-
nental partners. Conversely, the other
WEU member countries, for which
only ceilings are fixed, no longer suffer
any discrimination.
136. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes
defining a new category of forces and an all-
round commitment to earmark for joint defence
purposes, in peacetime, conventional forces
which would be calculated on the basis of the
commitments imposed on the United Kingdom
in Protocol No. II.
137. Similarly, Protocol No. III has lost all
meaning since no one fears the overarmament of
any member state. Deletion of the lists of arma-
ments subject to control has made it mean-
ingless, except for Article III, which is not
applied by the only country effectively con-
cerned, France, in regard to its nuclear weapons.
Deletion of the discriminatory provisions con-
cerning the Federal Republic and extension to all
members of WEU of the commitments entered
into by the United Kingdom lead naturally to the
deletion of Article III, which is not respected and
which, if it were, would discriminate against
France, and consequently of the whole protocol.
Maintaining agreements that are not respected is
the worst of solutions because it casts a slur on
the credibility of the treaty as a whole.
138. However, if commitments limiting
member countries' rights in armaments matters
were to be entered into in negotiations outside
the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty,
Protocol No. IV setting up the Agency for the
Control of Armaments would again assume its
full meaning, which is to have defined the status
of a body indepdndent of the governments
responsible for controlling application of Pro-
tocol No. III. On the one hand, it provides a
model that can be transposed to institutions
other than WEU and, on the other, it has allowed
methods to be worked out, archives built up and
experts trained, thus forming a capital of expe-
rience that could be used in the context ofinter-
national agreements on various aspects of arms
limitation or disarmament, as the thirty-fourth
annual report ofthe Council stresses in regard to
chemical weapons (part VI, paragraph 2). It is
clearly not possible to maintain an Agency for
the Control of Armaments if it is not responsible
for implementing one or more agreements, and
the disappearance of Protocol No. III would nec-
essarily involve that of Protocol No. IV.
139. Finally, it should be stressed that the
present situation, in which governments are
compelled to maintain an Agency without a
mandate, is a challenge to common sense and to
law. Any modification of the treaty implies a still
far from complete consensus on the very nature
of Europe and what the governments expect of it.
The present standstill in decisions relating to the
single seat of the ministerial organs is proof of
this.
140. On the other hand, it may be wondered
whether the platform adopted in The Hague and
the Rome declaration might not become new
protocols or whether some of their provisions
mlght not be included in the treaty itself, as your
Rapporteur suggested in the case of paragpph III
(a) 4 of ttie platform, which might be included in
Article YIII. Moreover, current discussions in
the Council should naturally lead to contractual
agreements on the defence effort required of
member countries. These agreements might also
form a new protocol, if necessary covering the
status of a possible agency to monitor efforts
actually made by each country and with powers
similar to those of the Agency for the Control of
Armaments, and replace the present Protocol
No. II.
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APPENDIX I
Preamble and Articles I, IL IIL Y and IX of the modilied Brussels Treaty
Preamble
(The High Contracting Parties)
Resolved:
To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person and in the other ideas proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;
. 
To. fortl$ a-qq preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the
constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;
_ -To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are
already united;
To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for
European economic recovery;
To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in main-
taining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;
To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;
- 
To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals
and animated by the like determination;
Desirin_g for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural
matters and for collective self-defence;
Have agreed as follows:
Anrlcrr I
Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order topromote the economic recovery of Europe, the high contracting parties will so organise and co-ordinate
their economic activities as to produce the best possible resulis, by the elimination of conflict in their
economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.
_ The co-operation qrgvi_${ for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through theCouncil referred to in Articli VIII, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplicati-on of,
or prejudice to, the work of other economic organisations in which the high contracting parties are oi
may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations.
Anucle II
. 
The high contracting parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in
specialised agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of tivihg by their peoples and to
develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.
. 
T4. high contraclng parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible appli-
cation of recommendations of immediate practical interest, ielating to socialmatters, adopted with ilieir
approval in the specialised agencies.
. 
- 
They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of
social security.
Anrrcrs III
- 
Thg high c_ontractlng p?rties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a
better undelstandin_g of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation ahd to promote
:::"*, 
exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.
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Anncrs V
If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other
high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United
:::r"rt 
afford the party so attacked dl the military and other aid and assistance in their power.
Anrror IX
The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in par-
ticular concerning the control of armaments to an assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels
Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.
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APPENDIX II
Resolution on the security of Western Europe
adopted by the European Parliament on l4th March 1989
The European Parliament,
- 
Having regard to the following resolutions:
- 
on security in Western Europe, by Mr. Poettering and others (Doc. B 2-1133186),
- 
on security in Europe, by Mrs. Charzat and Mr. Saby (Doc. B 2-L223/86),
- 
on relations between the EEC and WEU with a view to achieving European Union, by Mr.
De Gucht and others (Doc. B 2-590187),
- 
on the signing of the INF agreements and the consequences thereof for European security, by
Mr. Mallet and others (Doc. B 2-1524187),
- 
on a European contribution to the verification of disarmament measures, by Mr. Linkohr(Doc. B 2-293188\,
- 
Having regard to its resolution of 20th May 1988 on EUREKA,
- 
Having regard to the report of its Political Atrai$ Committee (Doc. lA-410l88),
A. Whereas security is the fruit of stable political and economic relations, the observation of human
rights and the existence of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes,
B. Whereas with modern technology and in the era of mutual assured nuclear destruction, security
can no longer be achieved by mililary means, or even by disarmament measures, alone, and whereas the
security of Western Europe will consequenfly depend also to a high degree on the development of a
network of co-operative relations with the states of Eastern Europe,
C. Whereas a coherent set of views on the security of Europe must be based on a stocktaking and
analysis of European interests, needs and risks,
D. Whereas the aim must be to elucidate and to bring closer together views and attitudes on:
(4 East-West relations,
(iil West-West relations,
(iii) the security relations of the Community and its member States with the rest of the world, as
well as their economic security,
(iu/ institutional arrangements,
E. Whereas in his statement before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 7th December
1988 General-Secretary Gorbachev announced unilateral Soviet troop reductions, whereby:
- 
Soviet troops are to be reduced by 500 0@ men over two years,
- 
by 1991 six tank divisions stationed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are to be
withdrawn and disbanded and the Soviet troop presence in those countries reduce4
Whereas the Soviet Union has moreover declared its intention to convert a number of Soviet
arms undertakings to civilian goods production, and to convert the Krasnoyarsk radar station into an
international research centre under United Nations auspices,
F. Having regard to Article 30(5) of the Singls European Act,
G. Having regar4 furthermore, to its resolution of l4th October 1987 on the political aspects of a
European security strategy,
H. Having regard to the Declaration of the European Council at Rhodes on the international r61e of
the European Community,
Takes the view that:
I. With regard to East-West relations
1. Current developments in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact deserve the positive support of
the European Community, with a view to conclurting new arms control agtreements that will increase
security on both sides, and to reaching agreements in other areas to implement and consolidate the Final
Act of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation;
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2. Welcomes the opening of the negotiations for conventional arms reductions in Vienna but
deplores the fact that in approaching these and other arms control and disarmament negotiations with
the Soviet Union, the Atlantic Alliance gives an impression of reacting to Soviet initiatives rather than
of presenting to public opinion a coherent policy which will preserve peace throt gh both nuclear and
conventional deterrence while securing a real reduction in the burden of armaments;
3. The member States of the European Community must nevertheless continue to take into account
that the Soviet Union is a European super-power with spheres of influence and security interests on the
European continent;
4. European security policy must be based both on defensive capability and an openness to d6tente;
5. European security must moreover be based on wide-ranging co-operation in the areas of the
economy, research, technology, environment protection and culture, to create a network of mutual
dependency that will support and consolidate security through the interpenetration ofshared interests;
6. Such a security policy must aim to prevent war and preserve dialogue through possession of a
politically and technically credible deterrent; this concept of defence will require further disarmament,
including asymmetrical reductions in conventional armed forces, with the objective of achieving a
balance at the lowest possible level, the elimination of chemical weapons and a balanced reduction of
the nuclear arsenals with the objective of retaining only a defensive capability on either side sufficient to
deter war;
7. Today the system of nuclear deterrence is a component in the system of military security in
Europe; the long-term objective remains to transcend the system of mutual deterrence by reducing arms
and antagonism within a European and world peace order;
8. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact should commit themselves to ensuring that their mutual
security can be enhanced by opting for defensive strategies and commensurate deployment of armed
forces, which should be as small as possible and should not be capable of launching surprise attacks and
large-scale offensives;
9. The revitalisation of WEU, the extension of which to include Portugal and Spain is welcomed,
can contribute towards the strengthening of Europe's r6le in the Atlantic Alliance without taking the
place of the co-operation on economic and political aspects of security provided for in Article 30(5) of
the SEA;
10. The European partner must, together with the United States and the other members of the
Atlantic Alliance, decide on a strategy and a plan for the armed forces necessary to maintaining their
security, whereby the armed forces and their equipment must be so structured as to ensure both a high
nuclear threshold and effective prevention of war;
I l. The countries of the European pillar must make a major contribution to devising the compre-
hensive concept of arms control and disarmament that was reaffirmed at the summit conference of the
Atlantic Alliance in Brussels of 2nd and 3rd March 1988, including:
(a) a 50 per cent reduction in American and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms;
(b) the complete abolition of chemical weapons;
(c) the setting of a stable and safe level of conventional forces by removing imbalances
throughout Europe, at a lower level and with equal upper limits;
(d) in conjunction with the abolition of chemical weapons and the establishment of a conven-
tional balance, substantial, progressive and verifiable reductions in American and Soviet
land-based short-range nuclear missile systems, bringrng them down to the same level;
12. The INF Treaty is a valuable step in a process of security-boosting and verifiable arms control
agreements;
13. The countries of the European pillar must try to ensure that in the forthcoming talks on conven-
tional stability special efforts are made to remove imbalances;
14. The use of new technologies must be centered on the strengthening of the defensive potential of
the armed forces;
15. The authorities should be given resources for studying the conversion of the weapons industry to
other uses and how this can be done;
16. Verification procedures are a very important part of arms control agreements, particularly in view
of the confidence-building aspects associated with them, and in this connection a separate European
observation satellite is desirable;
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17. Confidence-building and security-boosting measures such as those agreed at the European Dis-
annament Conference in Stockholm lead to greater openness and predictability and thus make a pos-
itive contribution to greater security in East-West relations, both as accompanying measures in arms
control agreements and separately;
18. Similarly, a positive conclusion of the Vienna Conference along the lines of the positive develop-
ments already recorded is a decisive factor in providing a solid and institutionally guaranteed basis for
disarmament and detente.
II. With regard to West-West relations
19. The security ofEurope calls for an increased effort ofco-operation by Europeans to defend and
ensure the integrity of their contribution to the Atlantic Alliance; it also depends on relations of loyal
friendship between the countries of the European Community and the United States founded on
genuine partnership and on permanent consultation on major international issues;
20. The Community members of the Atlantic Alliance must take care that in the transaflantic burden-
sharing debate all the relevant factors are taken into account, such as the numbers of troops, ships, air-
craft and tanks deployed by the various allies, the existence of compulsory military service in many
European NATO countries and the considerable facilities made available by some European NATO
members in the form of lan4 buildings and encampment costs;
21. Community member States belonging to the Alliance should be aware that, alongside the burden-
sharing issue, relations with the United States are also troubled by problems in agriculture, trade and
monetary policy;
22. The defence spending of the Communily members of the Atlantic Alliance should take account of
the stage reached in and the outcome of arms control and disarmament negotiations.
III. With regard to security relations with the rest of the world
and economic security
23. Member States must, in the framework of European political co-operation, continuously analyse
the situation in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Gulf, and, in the event of crisis, make every
effort to co-ordinate to the maximum their political and economic measures;
24. By pursuing a common policy on arms procurement within IEPG, the Community member
States belonging to the Alliance should be able to effect major savings and create a better balance in
transatlantic relations as far as arms procurements are concerned;
25. The completion of the internal market provides a sound technological and industrial basis for
European security;
26. The Council must draw up a new list of the products referred to in Article 223, paragaph l(b) of
the EEC Treaty;
27. The Community member States should endeavour to implement the recommendations of the
'Vredeling study $oup' of the IEPG;
IV. With regard to institutional anangements
28. The objective of European Union incorporated in the Single European Act is bound also to lead
to a European security policy;
29. Franco-German co-operation, which must be extended to other member States, could make a val-
uable contribution to European security;
30. The European Council should appoint a group ofexperts to report on:
- 
gving real substance to the security provisions of Article 30 of the Single European Act,
- 
the possible proposing of new provisions,
- Bving the citizens of Europe consistent and adequate information on security problems, by
means of the European Parliament, their elected representative body;
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31. This report should be taken into consideration should the EPC agreement be revised, as provided
for in Article 30(12) of the Single European Act;
32. The Foreign Ministers meeting in European political co-operation (EPC) should:
- 
ensure that security matters are dealt with more consistently in the framework of EPC and, if
necessary, and where recent developments appear to require it, to convene extraordinary
meetings devoted to problems of security;
- 
take duly into consideration the views of the European Parliament in the debates that are held
within the framework of EPC on problems of security;
- 
regularly inform the European Parliament's Political Affairs Committee, by holding quarterly
colloquies, of questions of security considered in the framework of EPC and of the extent to
which Parliament's views have been taken into consideration in the discussions;
- 
report to the plenary sitting of the European Parliament at least once during each presidency on
the problems of security considered in the framework of EPC, so as to ensure that a joint debate
can be held on that subject;
- 
defend common positions in the institutions and international conferences called to consider
questions of security, taking the views of the European Parliament into account.
*
rfi*
Calls on the President-in-Office of European Political Co-operation formally to submit his obser-
vations on this resolution, pursuant to title I, point 7(2) of the Decision of 28th February 1986;
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the European Council, the
Council, European Political Co-operation, the Chairman of the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of
the member States.
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